The most prominent theories of perceptual content are incapable of accounting for the phenomenal particularity of perceptual experience. This difficulty, or so I argue, springs from the absence of a series of distinctions that end up turning the problem apparently unsolvable. After briefly examining the main shortcomings of representationalism and naïve realism, I advance a proposal of my own that aims to make the trivial fact of perceptually experiencing a particular object as such philosophically unproblematic. Though I am well aware of the sketchy and schematic way in which my proposal is advanced and the other alternatives are criticized, I hope this paper is still worth its ink at least insofar as it is capable of pointing to a novel and promising way out of old and resilient difficulties that have been haunting philosophers of perception. If not a fully developed theory, at least I deliver here a sketch that, or so I sell, is worth the bet.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2018.V41N1.MA
Reference
Alves, Marco Aurélio Sousa. 2018. “Singularidade Fenomênica E Conteúdo Perceptivo”. Manuscrito 41 (1): 67–91. https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2018.V41N1.MA.