Autores
- Leonardo Lana de Carvalho
- João Eduardo Kogler
Resumo
The computational theory of cognition, or computationalism, holds that cognition is a form of computation. Two issues related to this view are comprised by the goal of this paper: A) Computing systems are traditionally seen as representational systems, but functional and enactive approaches support non-representational theories; B) Recently, a sociocultural theory against computationalism was proposed with the aim of ontologically reducing computing to cognition. We defend, however, that cognition and computation are in action, thus cognition is just a form of computing and that cognition is the explanatory basis for computation. We state that: 1. Representational theories of computing recurring to intentional content run into metaphysical problems. 2. Functional non-representational theories do not incur this metaphysical problem when describing computing in terms of the abstract machine. 3. Functional theories are consistent with enactive in describing computing machines not in a strictly functional way, but especially in terms of their organization. 4. Enactive cognition is consistent with the computationalism in describing Turing machines as functionally and organizationally closed systems. 5. The cognitive explanatory basis for computing improves the computational theory of cognition. When developed in the human linguistic domain, computer science is seen as a product of human socionatural normative practices, however, cognition is just an explanatory, not ontological, basis for computing. The paper concludes by supporting that computation is in action, that cognition is just one form of computing in the world and the explanatory basis for computation.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2020.12.004
Referência
The enactive computational basis of cognition and the explanatory cognitive basis for computing. Leonardo Lana de Carvalho & João Eduardo Kogler, Cognitive Systems Research, v. 67, june 2021, pp. 96-103.